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Texas Law Review
Dicta
Book Review
REASONING FROM RACE: FEMINISM, LAW, AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS
REVOLUTION. By Serena Mayeri. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard
University Press, 2011. 382 pages. $39.95.

Lolita Buckner Inniss*
I.

Introduction

Because racism is inimical to our founding ideals, the black struggle for
civil rights spurred public debate for decades and helped to shape much of
twentieth-century jurisprudence. Black civil rights advocacy challenged
prevailing legal understandings and norms, and ultimately succeeded on
many fronts. Due to its successes, black civil rights became the paradigm for
other identity-based rights claims such as the quest for women’s equality,
and this race–sex congruence framed the legal strategy of many feminist
advocates.1 There are a number of works that address the history of the
relationship between feminism, law, and the civil rights movement.2 Some
* Joseph C. Hostetler-Baker and Hostetler Professor of Law, Cleveland–Marshall College of
Law, Cleveland State University. Ph.D, Osgoode Hall, York University; L.L.M., Osgoode Hall
Law School, York University; J.D., University of California, Los Angeles; A.B., Princeton
University. The author thanks Professor Alfred Brophy of the University of North Carolina School
of Law and Associate Dean and Professor Kevin Johnson of the University of California, Davis for
their comments on an early draft of this Review.
1. SERENA MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE: FEMINISM, LAW, AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS
REVOLUTION 2–4 (2011).
2. See, e.g., CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM: A READER (Adrien Katherine Wing ed., 2d ed. 2003)
(collecting essays regarding the intersections among race, racism, civil rights, and constitutional
law); Elsa Barkley Brown, “What Has Happened Here”: The Politics of Difference in Women’s
History and Feminist Politics, in “WE SPECIALIZE IN THE WHOLLY IMPOSSIBLE”: A READER IN
BLACK WOMEN’S HISTORY 39, 42–43, 48 (Darlene Clark Hine et al. eds., 1995) (encouraging
nonlinear and asymmetrical analysis of women’s history, and acknowledging the varied experiences
of women and African-Americans); Bernie D. Jones, Southern Free Women of Color in the
Antebellum North: Race, Class, and a “New Women’s Legal History,” 41 AKRON L. REV. 763, 769
& n.27 (2008) (citing Evelyn Brooks Higginbotham, African-American Women’s History and the
Metalanguage of Race, in “WE SPECIALIZE IN THE WHOLLY IMPOSSIBLE”: A READER IN BLACK

writings have queried the oft-presumed consubstantiality of the civil rights
movement of the 1960s and 1970s with the feminist movement, with many
addressing the complex relationship between race and gender.3 While many
of these writings acknowledge the debt that feminist jurisprudence owes to
race-based legal theories, some give the impression of a simple borrowing of
established ideas. Serena Mayeri challenges such accounts in Reasoning
from Race.4 Mayeri explores the organic process by which theories formed
in the context of black civil rights were reformulated and deployed by
feminist legal theorists.5 In assessing both Mayeri’s book and the process of
reasoning from race that she addresses, two popular culture endeavors come
to mind as apposite metaphors: jazz6 and double-dutch jump rope.7
WOMEN’S HISTORY, supra, at 3, 3–24) (recognizing the value of understanding the intersection
between race and gender in critical theories); see also Cynthia Grant Bowman et al., Race and
Gender in the Law Review, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 27, 27 (2006) (observing the emerging intersection
of race and gender issues in Northwestern Law Review scholarship, when its content originally
“reflect[ed] a territory inhabited only by white males and their legal problems”).
3. Race and sex have often been discussed in the context of “intersectional analysis”—engaging
in a multifaceted analysis that addresses the ways in which various socially- or culturallyconstructed identity categories interact. See Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection
of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and
Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 166 (arguing that black liberationists and feminists
cannot ignore the intersections of their respective constituents’ experiences). There is a large body
of scholarship on intersectionality, and it has become almost an article of faith in some scholarly
areas. For some of the foundational writings in this area, see id.; Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the
Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L.
REV. 1241 (1991); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism In Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L.
REV. 581 (1990); and Judy Scales-Trent, Black Women and the Constitution: Finding Our Place,
Asserting Our Rights, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 9 (1989). For an overview of works examining
the intersection between “racial power” and “social life,” see Kimberlé Crenshaw et al.,
Introduction to CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT
(Kimberlé Crenshaw et al. eds., 1996), reprinted in THE CANON OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT
903, 903–25 (David Kennedy & William W. Fisher III eds., 2006). One scholar has offered an
alternate view of intersectionality. Gowri Ramachandran, Intersectionality as “Catch 22”: Why
Identity Performance Demands Are Neither Harmless Nor Reasonable, 69 ALB. L. REV. 299 (2005).
Ramachandran coins the word intersectionals as a noun meaning “persons who are members of
more than one ‘low-status’ category, such as women of color, queer persons of color, or indigent
women.” Id. at 301. She then uses intersectionality to refer to the conflict created by multiple
competing identities. Id. at 303.
4. SERENA MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE: FEMINISM, LAW, AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS
REVOLUTION (2011).
5. Id. at 4–6.
6. Jazz music is a sonorous, syncopated music originated by black musicians at the beginning of
the twentieth century. PETER TOWNSEND, JAZZ IN AMERICAN CULTURE viii (2000). Jazz, though
including many diverse trends in music, is said to have three fundamental characteristics: (1)
improvisation; (2) syncopated, offbeat, and, often, multiple rhythms; (3) a sound that, though often
founded on written notes, may exist entirely outside of the notes as a result of differing styles of
play; and (4) unique tones infused into the preexisting melody that frames the work. See generally
id. at 3–32 (summarizing the melodic and improvisational features of jazz music). Jazz offers the
right to solo and valorizes improvisation and change, but ultimately recognizes all such riffs as part
of the process of enriching and supporting the underlying song. See Thomas Brothers, Solo and
Cycle in African-American Jazz, 78 MUSICAL Q. 479, 489 (1994) (observing that jazz solos depart
from fixed rhythms yet depend on the song’s underlying harmony to provide the solo with
meaning).
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Jazz has been widely used as a metaphor for critical-race-theory
discussions.8 However, I employ the jazz metaphor here to help articulate
the way in which reasoning from race was sometimes considered “secondclass” reasoning in comparison to conventional legal reasoning and
mainstream jurisprudence. This is similar to how early jazz was defined by
and disparaged in its relation to Western classical music.9 Moreover, jazz as
a metaphor helps to describe the relationship between feminist legal
strategies and civil rights legal strategies: feminist legal theorists have at
times disdained and at times embraced reasoning from race in much the same
way that some jazz artists have rejected assertions of the musical “otherness”
of jazz as they queried its place in the larger Western musical canon.10

7. Double-dutch jumping is an elaborate game of jump rope in which the rope turners
systematically turn two ropes in tandem and jumpers try to meet the challenges mounted by the
turners. KYRA D. GAUNT, THE GAMES BLACK GIRLS PLAY: LEARNING THE ROPES FROM DOUBLEDUTCH TO HIP-HOP 134–35 (2006). In the basic game of double-dutch, the ropes are equidistant at
all times, with one up and one down; as one rope converges toward the other, the other must move
away to keep the ropes in play. See id. at 134 (describing the “elliptical space” created by the
turning ropes). However, the most that expert turners can do is to bring the ropes parallel on the
ground or in the air, or overlap them at will, without halting the movement of the ropes. See id. at
134 (describing the undulating nature of the ropes in double-dutch). Double-dutch jumping has in
other instances been used as a metaphor for combining two diverse but closely related narrative
strands. See, e.g., VALERIE LEE, GRANNY MIDWIVES AND BLACK WOMEN WRITERS: DOUBLEDUTCHED READINGS 2–3 (1996) (elaborating on the metaphor as it relates to the life stories of
African-American grannies and their representation by African-American authors).
8. Some theorists have noted the relationship between jazz and critical race theory, focusing
especially on the traits of improvisation and multiplicity. See, e.g., John O. Calmore, Critical Race
Theory, Archie Shepp, and Fire Music: Securing an Authentic Intellectual Life in a Multicultural
World, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2129, 2135 n.13 (1992) (noting that jazz and critical race theory are
joined by a “common tradition of African-American culture that speaks of a perspective structured
by emphatic declarations of dissent from dominant norms”); Jonathan A. Beyer, Note, The Second
Line: Reconstructing the Jazz Metaphor in Critical Race Theory, 88 GEO. L.J. 537, 554 (2000)
(“Just as Ellington developed the singular sounds of his musicians into an improved group harmony,
critical race scholars may accommodate the particularities of race into a pluralist society.”); see also
Christopher A. Bracey, Adjudication, Antisubordination, and the Jazz Connection, 54 ALA. L. REV.
853, 858 (2003) (arguing that characteristics of jazz music, including improvisation and
reimagination, should inform how judges act with respect to issues confronting subordinated
groups); Alfred L. Brophy, Foreword, Lawyers and Social Change in American Legal History, 54
ALA. L. REV. 771, 778 & n.35 (2003) (discussing the unfinished work of the late Kellis Parker,
Jazz: The Law the Slaves Made, that draws parallels between law and jazz); Kevin R. Johnson,
Commentary, Roll Over Beethoven: “A Critical Examination of Recent Writing About Race,” 82
TEXAS L. REV. 717, 722 n.24 (2004) (observing that “[critical race theory] traditionally has had an
improvisational quality to it”).
9. See Lolita Buckner Inniss, A ‘Ho New World, Raced and Gendered Insult as Ersatz Carnival
and the Corruption of Freedom of Expression Norms, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 43, 51
(2009) (citing Reginald Thomas, The Rhythm of Rhyme: A Look at Rap Music as an Art Form from
a Jazz Perspective, in AFRICAN AMERICAN JAZZ AND RAP: SOCIAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL
EXAMINATIONS OF BLACK EXPRESSIVE BEHAVIOR 163, 163–64 (James L. Conyers, Jr. ed., 2001))
(observing that jazz “affronted mainstream norms” at its inception). Thomas describes how blues
music, ragtime, and jazz were, when first offered, greatly scrutinized and often deemed unworthy of
being called art. Id. at 51.
10. ERIC PORTER, WHAT IS THIS THING CALLED JAZZ? AFRICAN AMERICAN MUSICIANS AS
ARTISTS, CRITICS, AND ACTIVISTS, at xv–xvi, 159–61 (2002). Porter writes, “Musicians have also
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Double-dutch jumping is a metaphor that captures the fluid relationship
between feminist legal projects and the black civil rights movement along not
only occasionally diverging strands but also along converging, parallel, or
intersecting strands. Few writings have explored both the ideological
groundings as well as the pragmatic understandings about how racial
analogies informed feminist strategies. This may be a result of the failure to
closely interrogate the nature of the racial antecedents of sex discrimination
norms in law. Serena Mayeri helps to fill this void with Reasoning from
Race.
II.

Overview of the Book

Mayeri offers a history of the legal strategy of “reasoning from race,”
that is, using antiblack racism as a principal analogy to inform strategies to
counter sex discrimination.11 In its scope and depth, the book is in some
respects a primer that offers an advocate’s look at some of the cases that
form the core of United States women’s rights jurisprudence and especially
of major United States Supreme Court cases. Along the way, Reasoning
from Race also brings to light some of the lawyers behind the cases,
especially several whose work in the area of women’s rights may be less
well-known, such as Caruthers Gholsen Berger,12 Jane Picker,13 and Ruth

negotiated the fields of jazz and classical music, sometimes reifying the distinctions between them
and at other times seeking to dismantle the boundaries that separate them.” Id. at xv. He adds,
Many jazz musicians have been trained as classical players but have seen their
ambitions in the realm of concert music stymied by racial discrimination. They have
also been aware of jazz’s “second-class” status in relation to classical music. For some
of these musicians, seeking to dismantle the divisions between the fields or defining
their music as an alternative “classical” tradition has been a means of legitimizing their
own artistic projects. Yet for others, emphasizing the distinctions between jazz and
classical music has been a more affirming vision.
Id.
11. Note that “reasoning from race” refers to a particular jurisprudential approach that adopts
certain legal norms, perspectives, and arguments due to race. MAYERI, supra note 1, at 4–5.
Reasoning from race especially refers to approaches that situate blacks as the archetypal “other”
against which to measure both whites and other oppressed groups. WENDY LEO MOORE,
REPRODUCING RACISM: WHITE SPACE, ELITE LAW SCHOOLS, AND RACIAL INEQUALITY 78 (2008).
Reasoning from race is to be distinguished from the more general practice of racial reasoning,
though the two are related. Racial reasoning is a broader political and ethical construct that supports
taking certain social, legal, or even, moral positions. See id. (noting the rhetorical and ideological
techniques employed by civil rights leaders to gain greater access to legal rights); see also CORNEL
WEST, RACE MATTERS 26 (2001) (observing that “blackness is a political and ethical construct,”
which includes a “political and ethical dimension”). Racial reasoning is premised on claims of
racial authenticity that come from race-based oppression or struggle. WEST, supra, at 26; see also
Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Talkin’ that Talk, in “RACE,” WRITING, AND DIFFERENCE 402, 402 (Henry
Louis Gates, Jr. ed., 1986) (observing that analyses of race are often untethered to observations and
empirics). Gates writes, “‘Racial reasoning’ . . . is reasoning from causes to effects without
reference to experience, in terms of a fixed essence.” Id.
12. MAYERI, supra note 1, at 29–30, 37.
13. Id. at 108. Cleveland lawyer and law professor Jane Picker, who represented plaintiffs
Elizabeth Smith and Jo Carol LaFleur, founded the Women’s Law Fund, a Cleveland-based

4

Weyand.14 Given its structure and focus, Reasoning from Race seems to fall
within the increasingly influential genre of applied legal history—legal–
historical work that, in self-reflexive fashion, “works history,” seeking to
make legal history directly relevant to contemporary socio-legal concerns.15
Reasoning from Race, however, is more of a prolegomenon that explains
how the process of reasoning from race developed, thereby laying a
foundation for new understandings and exposing the potential for new
applications. In this regard, it may be equally apt to describe this work as
one of critical legal history.16
The introduction considers how reasoning from race is currently
deployed in discussing efforts to expand the civil rights of gays and lesbians,
and describes how, despite an intriguing and in many ways successful
strategy of feminist reasoning from race, the business of sex equality is still
unfinished.17 The book goes on to explore the renaissance of race–sex
analogies in the 1960s that revitalized and expanded race–sex congruence
theories that had briefly flourished but then went fallow in the post-Civil War
era and in the 1940s and 1950s.18 The book then shows how women and
minorities were discursively paired in a feminist project that was at once
deconstructive and reconstitutive, seeking to dismantle sex-based inequalities

advocacy group that addressed women’s legal concerns. See id. (describing the representation of
Smith and LaFleur); Deborah Dinner, Recovering the LaFleur Doctrine, 22 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM
343, 365 (2010) (describing the Women’s Law Fund). Picker was in large measure responsible for
the groundbreaking decision in Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974),
which held pregnancy dismissal policies unconstitutional. MAYERI, supra note 1, at 651. LaFleur
has been described as an underdiscussed case from the perspective of both women’s rights
jurisprudence and constitutional jurisprudence more broadly. See Dinner, supra, at 344–45 (“No
scholar has yet comprehensively researched the social and legal history of the case.”).
14. MAYERI, supra note 1, at 108, 114.
15. See, e.g., Robert N. Clinton, The Curse of Relevance: An Essay on the Relationship of
Historical Research to Federal Indian Litigation, 28 ARIZ. L. REV. 29, 44, 46 (1986) (contrasting
“applied, relevant Native American history” to more conventional approaches to Native American
history, and arguing that applied history goes beyond non-Indian sources and has more
contemporary relevance); see also, e.g., Sarah Ludington et al., Applied Legal History:
Demystifying the Doctrine of Odious Debts, 11 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 247, 248–50 (2010) (applying
the history of odious debts to modern discourse). Applied legal history may be seen as a narrower
strand of a much larger endeavor, applied history—sometimes called public history. See REBECCA
CONARD, BENJAMIN SHAMBAUGH AND THE INTELLECTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC HISTORY
148 (2002) (highlighting the emergence of the public-history movement from other traditions,
including applied history and commonwealth history); see also 1 Benjamin F. Shambaugh,
Introduction to STATE HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF IOWA, APPLIED HISTORY, at viii–ix (Benjamin F.
Shambaugh ed., 1912) (arguing that applied history arose from “the use of the creative power of
scientific knowledge in politics and administration”).
16. A critical legal history is one that, among other things, understands that common ways of
thinking about law and history are “as culturally and historically contingent as ‘society’ and ‘law’
themselves.” Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 101 (1984).
Moreover, critical legal history understands that conventional views of legal history are mediated by
entrenched narrative story lines infused with ideological purposes. Id. at 101–02.
17. MAYERI, supra note 1, at 1–2.
18. Id. at 10, 11.
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for all women by querying certain givens of law and social policy.19 Chapter
3 details how, just as the strategy of reasoning from race began to bear fruit,
the economic recession of the mid-1970s helped to deepen resistance to
women’s equality and damaged already tenuous coalitions around race and
gender.20 Chapters 4 and 5 address the growing disaggregation of race–sex
analogies as legal advocates for women saw such claims as liabilities in an
increasingly hostile legal climate.21 Buoyed by victories premised on
reasoning primarily from sex, some feminist strategists embraced norms of
formal equality over substantive equality. Chapter 6 describes the late civil
rights era of 1977 and beyond when, after a period in which the race–sex
analogies used by feminists were sometimes hidden from view, they were
once again placed on the main stage of feminist legal theorizing.22 The
conclusion brings the reader back to the beginning by considering how
reasoning from race may not be a winning strategy for prevailing in the fight
against sexual-orientation discrimination and by summarizing the history of
feminist reasoning from race premised on the black civil rights movement.23
Finally, in a postscript chapter, the author tells us what became of some of
the key figures in the book.24
III. The Principal Strengths of Reasoning from Race
Much of the power of Reasoning from Race lies in its penetrating look
at how legal advocates reshaped the relationship between racial inequality
and gender inequality, especially during the 1960s and 1970s. Reasoning
from Race also offers a potent reminder that though race–sex analogies are
now considered unremarkable and indeed are sometimes viewed as an
almost-required part of sustaining arguments in support of women’s rights,25
this has only been consistently true since the 1960s and 1970s.26 The book
focuses on groups and individuals responsible for the rise of this sort of
argument. A key figure was Anna Pauline “Pauli” Murray, a black lawyer,
activist, and scholar, whose interest in the women’s rights agenda was

19. See generally id. at 41–75.
20. Id. at 76–105.
21. Id. at 106–85.
22. Id. at 186–224.
23. Id. at 225–33.
24. See, e.g., id. at 234 (discussing the death of Pauli Murray). For a discussion of Pauli
Murray’s role in women’s activism, see infra Part III.
25. On the inevitability of reasoning from race, Mayeri quotes legal scholar Janet E. Halley,
who stated, “[A]sking the advocates of gay, women’s or disabled peoples’ rights to give up ‘like
race’ similes would be like asking them to write their speeches and briefs without using the word
the.” MAYERI, supra note 1, at 2 (citing Janet E. Halley, Gay Rights and Identity Imitation: Issues
in the Ethics of Representation, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 115, 120
(David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998)).
26. See id. at 5–6 (recognizing the varied history of reasoning from race, beginning with its
emergence in the 1960s).
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spurred by her own experiences with both racism and sexism.27 Mayeri
briefly considers how Murray’s own struggles with sexual identity may have
been a catalyst for her work in the area of women’s rights.28 Murray’s sexual
identity, though in no way a major strand of the work, is a riff on the almost
jazz-like theme of the relevance of reasoning from race to gay-and-lesbian
rights offered at the beginning and end of the book.29 This is part of the
“unfinished business of sex equality” that Mayeri refers to in her
introduction:30 even in light of significant gains for blacks and women, there
is still a deep divide as to whether to give full protection to sexual orientation
or gender identities and expressions.
Murray receives particular attention from Mayeri; one might argue that
she is the heroine of the book. Murray railed against what she called “Jane
Crow”—the exclusion of women from certain types of male-identified
activities.31 Jane Crow was, of course, a pun on Jim Crow, the series of laws
enacted mostly in the South in the latter half of the nineteenth century that
restricted many of the new privileges granted to blacks after the Civil War
and enforced a rigid system of racial segregation.32 In terming discrimination
against women Jane Crow, Murray harnessed the rhetoric of almost a
century of white racist animosity aimed at blacks and the resultant black
demoralization and disenfranchisement.
IV. Conclusion
Reasoning from Race traces the varying agendas of the multiple aspects
of feminist reasoning from race—from hesitant recognition of race–sex
similarity to acceptance. If there is any shortcoming at all to this book, it is
its relatively brief treatment of the black-feminist movement, especially in
view of the book’s allusion to the common critique of the feminist movement
as benefitting only white women. In large measure, Reasoning from Race is
about how feminist legal theorists incorporated into the “woman question”

27. Id. at 3 (activist background); id. at 16 (sexism); id. at 23–24 (racism).
28. Id. at 16.
29. In jazz, the theme is a musical interlude that sets the tone throughout but often appears only
at the beginning and the end. See Avril Dankworth, Introductory, in JAZZ: AN INTRODUCTION TO
ITS MUSICAL BASIS (1968), reprinted in ANDREW CLARK, RIFFS & CHORUSES: A NEW JAZZ
ANTHOLOGY 22, 22 (2001) (observing thematic variation in jazz compositions, including that “later
choruses often break away from [the theme] entirely” and “become new melodies”). A riff is a
short, incisive musical passage that is repeated but with subtle variations on a theme. Albert
Murray, Playing the Blues, in SIGNIFYIN(G), SANCTIFYIN’, & SLAM DUNKING: A READER IN
AFRICAN AMERICAN EXPRESSIVE CULTURE 96, 98 (Gena Dagel Caponi ed., 1999).
30. MAYERI, supra note 1, at 2.
31. See id. at 15 (identifying Jane Crow as a label for sexism).
32. JERROLD M. PACKARD, AMERICAN NIGHTMARE: THE HISTORY OF JIM CROW vii–viii
(2003) (providing an overview of Jim Crow segregation); ROSALIND ROSENBERG, DIVIDED LIVES:
AMERICAN WOMEN IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 169 (rev. ed. 2008) (describing the link between
Jim Crow and Jane Crow).
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legal theories drawn from the black (formerly, the Negro) question.33
Although Mayeri gives attention to black women advocates (such as Pauli
Murray, Eleanor Holmes Norton, and Patricia Roberts Harris)34 and to black
women plaintiffs (such as Emma DeGraffenreid35 and Elizabeth Smith36)
who helped to frame the larger feminist legal program, the black-woman
question37 on its own terms is mostly absent from the book. To put the
woman question and the black-woman question in the context of jazz, the
woman question is a jazz takeoff of mainstream male-centric social and legal
norms, capturing the underlying values and claims as its melody but
reinvigorating them and reforming them to make a new musical standard. In
like fashion, the black-woman question may be seen as a riff on the feminist
jazz song, offering its own twists and turns, but it nonetheless enriches and
informs feminism’s underlying melody.38
Mayeri clearly establishes that racial discrimination as a core analogy
has deeply informed sex discrimination jurisprudence. Reasoning from Race
makes manifest that race and sex remain inexorably linked and that together
they help to form the basis of what one commentator has called a

33. The woman question “focused attention on men and male social roles, asking questions
about the nature and function of gender, and whether gender should be a factor in granting or
limiting rights such as voting.” Lolita Buckner Inniss, Toward a Sui Generis View of Black Rights
in Canada? Overcoming the Difference—Denial Model of Countering Anti-Black Racism, 9
BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 32, 68 (2007). The black question refers to the century-old
problem of fitting blacks into the American polity. See generally W.E.B. DUBOIS, THE STUDY OF
THE NEGRO PROBLEMS (Am. Acad. of Political & Soc. Sci. 1898), available at 568 ANAMAPSS
13 (WL) (identifying considerations concerning the study of problems affecting African-Americans
in the late nineteenth century).
34. MAYERI, supra note 1, at 47–50.
35. Emma DeGraffenreid was the plaintiff in DeGraffenreid v. General Motors Assembly
Division, St. Louis, 413 F. Supp. 142 (E.D. Mo. 1976). The District Court, in rejecting a black
woman’s claim of both race and sex discrimination under Title VII, found that plaintiffs could not
“combine statutory remedies to create a new ‘super-remedy.’” Id. at 143.
36. Elizabeth Smith was the plaintiff in Smith v. City of East Cleveland, 363 F. Supp 1131
(N.D. Ohio 1973). In Smith, the court used 43 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to find that the East Cleveland Police Department’s height and weight
requirements disproportionately excluded women and that the written test discriminated against
blacks and women. Id. at 1144.
37. The black-woman question addresses the multiple forms of oppression often faced by black
women, including gender, race, and class discrimination. See Inniss, supra note 33, at 68–69 & 69
n.192 (citing JERRY GAFIO WATTS, AMIRI BARAKA: THE POLITICS AND ART OF A BLACK
INTELLECTUAL 346 (2001)) (exploring the sociological intersections of the different forms of
oppression that black women confront in Canada and the United States).
38. See Amy Leigh Wilson, Commentary, A Unifying Anthem or Path to Degradation?: The
Jazz Influence in American Property Law, 55 ALA. L. REV. 425, 425 (2004) (stating that the
“unconventional nature of jazz reflects the modernizing American spirit”). Wilson writes, “The
story of jazz is the story of both America's struggle to accept changing moral, political, and legal
views and the clashing resistance against those views.” Id. (citing BURTON W. PERETTI, JAZZ IN
AMERICAN CULTURE 11 (1997)).
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“perspectivist aesthetic.”39 Mayeri succeeds admirably in addressing the
diverse but closely allied strands of legal strategizing about feminism
premised on race. Her book, in jazz-like fashion, gives color, tone, depth,
and rich, legal–historical detail to an account that has at other times been
presented as a grayscale grand narrative. Mayeri moreover interweaves in
elegant, double-dutch jump rope fashion the sometimes divergent, sometimes
convergent, and always related legal–historical strands of race and sex
analogies in the search for women’s rights.

39. Pierre Schlag, Commentary, The Aesthetics of American Law, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1047,
1085 (2002) (“The introduction and development of a perspectivist aesthetic in American law owes
much to feminist and critical race theory scholarship of the 1980s and 1990s.”).
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